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Beyond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise of
‘Managed and Controlled’
by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
In the new version of his Stop Tax Haven AbuseAct, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., once again proposed
to modify the definition of residence for domestic cor-
porations (IRC section 7701). Section 103 of the act
seeks to:
stop companies run from the United States claiming for-
eign status by treating foreign corporations that are
publicly traded or have gross assets of $50 million
or more and whose management and control oc-
cur primarily in the United States as U.S. domes-
tic corporations for income tax purposes.1 [Em-
phasis in original.]
This is not a new suggestion. In response to the in-
versions of the early 2000s, the Joint Committee on
Taxation made a similar proposal.2 Moreover, the
‘‘managed and controlled’’ test is well established in
the jurisprudence of our trading partners (for example,
the U.K.) and is similar to determining the ‘‘place of
effective management,’’ which is included in all tax
treaties based on the OECD model (for example, in
article 8).
The original point of the managed and controlled
proposal was to combat inversions, that is, artificial
migrations of U.S. companies to offshore locations
such as Bermuda. In a classic inversion, the share-
holders of a publicly traded U.S. company would ex-
change their shares for shares in a new Bermudan com-
pany, which would then become the parent of the
group. The advantage of this maneuver was:
• to enable the group to add new subsidiaries that
would not be controlled foreign corporations and
whose income is therefore outside the scope of
subpart F; and
• to enable the U.S. parent to borrow from its Ber-
muda parent and deduct the interest up to the
IRC section 163(j) limit without triggering subpart
F (since the Bermudan company is not a CFC).
It is not clear that the managed and controlled test
is necessary to combat inversions, for two reasons.
First, IRC section 7874 was enacted in 2004 and puts
significant roadblocks in front of inversions, although it
has loopholes that can be exploited. Second, and more
importantly, recent empirical research suggests that in-
versions are difficult for most U.S. companies for both
tax and nontax reasons (for example, shareholder reluc-
tance to switch Bermuda for Delaware law for corpo-
rate governance purposes).31See http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/
summary-of-the-stop-tax-haven-abuse-act-of-2011. For the text of
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 1346, section 103, see Doc
2011-15182 or 2011 WTD 134-37.
2Staff of the JCT, ‘‘Options to Improve Tax Compliance and
Reform Tax Expenditures,’’ JCS-02-05 (Jan. 27, 2005), Doc 2005-
1714, 2005 WTD 21-22. For the history of the idea, see generally
NYSBA Tax Section, ‘‘Report on the Management and Control
Provisions of the International Tax Competitiveness Act of
2011’’ (Jan. 31, 2011), Doc 2011-2180, 2011 WTD 23-26.
3Eric Allen and Susan Morse, ‘‘Firm Incorporation Outside
the U.S.: No Exodus Yet’’ (2011). This paper was presented at
the 2011 National Tax Association Meeting in Washington and
will be presented at the American Tax Policy Conference on
International Taxation and Competitiveness in Washington on
October 17, 2011.
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Does ‘‘managed and controlled’’ still have a role to
play in U.S. tax policy if it is not needed to stop inver-
sions? In my opinion the answer is a resounding yes.
As Willard Taylor has shown, shell corporations are
ubiquitous in U.S. outbound international tax plan-
ning.4 Adopting ‘‘managed and controlled’’ would be a
significant deterrent to this type of planning, because it
would require all foreign corporations to actually be
run from abroad to avoid being redefined as U.S. cor-
porations.
A recent U.K. case illustrates some of the antiabuse
potential of ‘‘managed and controlled.’’5 In that case, a
Dutch company was owned by a U.K. non-domiciled
individual, who also served some time as director (but
not at the time of the relevant transaction). The U.K.
CFC rules were inapplicable because the individual
was not a U.K. resident for tax purposes. The board
met overseas and had full legal control of the com-
pany. Nevertheless, the U.K. court (including Commis-
sioner John Avery Jones, a very tax-sophisticated
judge) found that because the U.K. shareholder exer-
cised de facto control of the company, it was managed
and controlled from the U.K. and therefore was resi-
dent in the U.K. for tax purposes.
Imagine the consequences of adopting such a de
facto control test in the U.S. It would further deter in-
versions and would make it difficult for U.S.-based
hedge funds and nonprofits to use blockers to avoid
effectively connected income and unrelated business
taxable income without actually operating the blockers
offshore.6 These are significant improvements over the
current system.
But the biggest impact will be on subpart F. The
debate between opponents and proponents of deferral
and territoriality seems unlikely to produce real reform
any time soon. But if we adopted the managed and
controlled test, it would become much more difficult
for U.S. multinationals to avoid subpart F merely by
creating shell companies overseas and using one of the
myriad loopholes in the existing rules.
To name some recent examples, Microsoft and
Google would have to really run their Irish, Dutch,
and Bermudan CFCs from those countries to avoid
having them re-characterized as U.S. corporations. Cat-
erpillar would not be able to avoid the base company
rule by putting a shell operation in Switzerland while
running the actual buying and selling of spare parts
from Peoria, Illinois. Using IRC section 954(c)(6) to
shift profits from high- to low-tax countries overseas
(which in turn encourages shifting from the U.S. to
high-tax countries) would become much more difficult
because the tax haven subsidiaries would really have to
be run from the tax havens.
No loophole closer is ever perfect.7 There will, of
course, be situations in which the tax benefit is so great
that companies will pay executives the extra compensa-
tion needed to persuade them to live in Bermuda. But
in many other cases the hassle will be too much. I
worked on a transaction once in which the entire care-
fully planned tax structure was jeopardized by the un-
willingness of the designated CEO of an offshore joint
venture to live outside the United States. Moving
people is harder than creating corporate shells.
Recent news reports as well as the careful JCT study
of transfer pricing from last summer have shown the
extent of tax avoidance by U.S. multinationals.8 The
best solution would be to abolish deferral in conjunc-
tion with lowering the corporate tax rate. A second-
best solution would be to condition deferral on the for-
eign tax rate being about as high as the U.S. rate.9 But
in the absence of such significant reform, Congress
would be well advised to at least adopt the managed
and controlled test for U.S. corporate residency. Such a
test would make corporate tax avoidance by U.S. multi-
nationals significantly more expensive for the actual
individuals who make the decisions to engage in such
behavior. As indicated by the outcry against the per-
sonal responsibility provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, putting the onus personally on the
decision-makers is the best deterrent. ◆
4Willard Taylor, ‘‘‘Blockers,’ ‘Stoppers,’ and the Entity Classi-
fication Rules,’’ 64 Tax Law. 1 (2010).
5Laerstate BV v. Commissioners, [2009] UKFTT 209 (TC).
6See Taylor, supra note 4.
7While the IRS may have a hard time identifying all the com-
panies to which the new rule applies to change their residence,
many of those cases should be covered by FIN 48 disclosure
and/or Schedule UTP.
8JCT, ‘‘Present Law and Background Related to Possible In-
come Shifting and Transfer Pricing,’’ JCX-37-10 (July 20, 2010),
Doc 2010-16144, 2010 WTD 139-29.
9See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Testimony on Territoriality and
Competitiveness, House Ways and Means Committee, May 24,
2011.
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